By many experts, the implementation of Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway, known as a Trans-Afghan corridor, is believed to be an important link connecting Central and South Asian regions. This project is ultimately expected to provide Central Asian countries with an access to Pakistan’s seaports of Gwadar and Karachi. Conversely, it will also open pathways for South Asian nations to enter the markets of Central Asia, Russia, and, eventually to Europe. Steps have already been taken toward the realization of this initiative. For example, the 75-km Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif railway line, which constitutes part of the broader project, has been operational since 2011. Since 2023, a coordination office for the project has been functioning in Tashkent. Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan continue to maintain the issue high on the agenda, both in trilateral and international formats, thereby elevating the project to the status of one of the region’s most prominent initiatives.
Despite being conscious about the complexity of this project’s implementation, Uzbekistan is eagerly pursuing it. Tashkent is thought to be more concerned about the completion of this project not because it provides Uzbekistan with a shorter possible rout to the world oceans but, the greater involvement of Tashkent in the project might give it a serendipitous possibility for achieving the concept of “Afghanistan is a part of Central Asia”. That is, this project provides Tashkent with a huge platform for greater trade, financial and human-to-human collaboration with Afghanistan, specifically its northernmost regions.
The Legal Status of Afghanistan
For so long, Afghanistan’s instability has been the primary reason as to why the construction of the railway has not been completed. Today, the Taliban has succeeded in asserting control over the country though, Afghanistan’s lack of international recognition poses significant challenges to its participation in global projects that require legal accountability. Moreover, the continued operation of terrorist cells such as ISKP and al-Qaeda on Afghan territory raises concerns among potential stakeholders. In addition, the Taliban’s alleged connections with Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Tajikistan undermine trust in Afghanistan from both Central and South Asian states.
The Durand Line
Under current conditions, the Trans-Afghan Corridor appears feasible only in the limited format of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul route. Further expansion of the corridor seems increasingly problematic due to enduring tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ongoing border conflicts between the two sides have effectively placed them in a quasi-military standoff. Periodic closures of cross-border trade points further jeopardize the development of regional commerce. According to reports, in April, Pakistan deported over 80,000 Afghans, thereby exacerbating the socio-economic strain on Afghanistan’s already fragile economy. Such developments along the Durand Line will undoubtedly have a critical impact on the viability of the corridor’s full implementation.
The Balochistan Factor
Even in the event of successful diplomatic efforts and the resolution of the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the issue of Baloch separatism – led by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which is designated as a terrorist organization in several countries – remains difficult to overlook. The seaports that Central Asian states seek access to, namely Gwadar and Karachi, are located in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, casting doubt on the feasibility of regional ambitions.
Large-scale infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing internal connectivity in Pakistan are often met with hostility by the Baloch population, as such developments are perceived to increase Islamabad’s power and mobility, particularly during critical situations. Likely for this reason, the BLA has targeted railway lines and instilled fear among the authorities of both Pakistan and China regarding the future of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is designed to link China’s Xinjiang province with Pakistan’s maritime outlets on the Indian Ocean.
The coordinated railway bombings in March of this year serve as a stark illustration of this threat. Furthermore, on April 13, BLA militants attacked and killed eight Pakistani nationals on Iranian territory, a development that risks undermining bilateral trust. Pakistani officials suspect Indian involvement in the BLA’s operations, arguing that India might benefit strategically from destabilizing Pakistan and thereby weakening Islamabad’s regional standing. New Delhi, however, categorically denies all such accusations.
Over the past year alone, the Baloch have carried out more than 150 attacks, many of which have primarily targeted Chinese nationals. This poses a significant threat not only to China’s CPEC initiative but also to the aspirations of Central Asian countries seeking to realize the Trans-Afghan Corridor. A legitimate concern arises: if a powerful global actor like China – with substantial influence on the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean – is struggling to ensure the security of its infrastructure, how can the comparatively less influential Central Asian countries expect to implement their own strategic projects successfully? All of these factors collectively cast serious doubt over the future viability of the Trans-Afghan Corridor.
New Delhi’s Perspective
The Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar Corridor, often framed as a key component of the broader agenda to enhance connectivity between Central and South Asia, falls short of fully embodying this vision due to the absence of participation from South Asia’s largest state – India. Instead, India has focused on developing an alternative route, the North–South Corridor, which utilizes Iran’s Chabahar Port, thereby redirecting New Delhi’s strategic attention toward Iran rather than Pakistan. As a result, India is pursuing a model of connectivity in which South Asia links to Central Asia indirectly, via the Middle East. This strategic divergence weakens the centrality of the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway in regional discourse and complicates the realization of the overarching vision of Central–South Asian interconnectivity.
Iran’s Aspiration
Iran’s perspective closely aligns with India’s strategic approach, as the Indian-led corridor provides Tehran with significant geopolitical advantages and influence in interregional dialogue. In addition, the development of the Chabahar Port under India’s initiative enhances Iran’s international image as a pivotal player in the grand connectivity projects of the Eurasian supercontinent. Furthermore, the potential removal of sanctions on Chabahar offers Tehran a rare opportunity to ease its broader economic and diplomatic isolation from the West. For these reasons, Iran is highly likely to continue supporting India’s initiative as a means of pursuing both strategic influence and economic reintegration.
Russia’s Ambiguity
Under the constraints of international sanctions, Russia generally supports all available routes and alternatives for accessing the markets of South Asia. Both Pakistan and India hold strategic value for Moscow as key destinations for Russian oil and gas exports. While Russia expresses its support for the Trans-Afghan Corridor, it is also an active participant in the North–South Transport Corridor. However, Russia’s interest in these initiatives appears to be predominantly economic. The development of connectivity corridors between Central and South Asia may also carry significant geopolitical implications, potentially offering Central Asian states new tools for diversifying the regional balance of power. Ultimately, the countries of the region could secure political and diplomatic backing from both India and Pakistan – nuclear powers in their own right. In such a context, Moscow may reconsider its current cautious posture and pursue full-fledged engagement in these projects.
Beijing’s Prudence
China pursues a clearly defined strategy for the expansion of global and Eurasian transport corridors under the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which encompasses multiple routes rather than a single one. The Trans-Afghan Corridor could potentially be incorporated into this extensive initiative, particularly as it may link in the future with the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and CPEC. If realized, the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway would thus be rebranded as a segment of the BRI. Nevertheless, China does not rely on this corridor for access to the Indian Ocean, as it already possesses direct connectivity via CPEC. While Beijing does not oppose the Trans-Afghan initiative and sees it as a viable alternative, it remains unenthusiastic about assuming the role of primary financial sponsor, demonstrating a cautious and calculated approach.
Western Boycott
The idea of reconnecting Central and South Asia was originally championed by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her address in India. During their military presence in Afghanistan, the United States and its Western allies viewed the Trans-Afghan Corridor with significant enthusiasm. However, the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ensuing boycott of the country led to the loss of major financial donors, particularly the United States. At present, Qatar has emerged as a key backer of the initiative, attempting to fill the void left by Washington. Nonetheless, Qatar lacks the structural capacity to regulate international transportation systems. Its participation in the corridor is more likely aimed at enhancing its international image and diplomatic prestige rather than exercising real strategic influence.
There are, however, emerging signs of a potential re-engagement by the United States in Afghanistan-related projects. The visits of Zalmay Khalilzad and Adam Boehler to Kabul in March of this year may mark the early stages of direct dialogue between Washington and the Taliban, hinting at the possibility of future cooperation. If sustained, such interaction could pave the way for renewed American involvement in regional connectivity initiatives, including the Trans-Afghan Corridor. This development, while still tentative, may significantly alter the geopolitical calculus surrounding the project.
The Central Asian Dilemma
Central Asian countries lack a unified stance on the development of the Trans-Afghan Corridor. While Uzbekistan is more inclined toward constructing the railway line Termiz–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar, Kazakhstan considers alternative routes into Afghanistan, including those passing through Turkmenistan. For Astana, relying solely on Uzbekistan for access to Afghanistan may carry political implications. In pursuit of regional leadership, Kazakhstan appears interested in diversifying its corridors rather than becoming overly dependent on Uzbekistan’s foreign trade policy. Meanwhile, Turkmenistan may derive greater economic benefit from the North–South Corridor than from the Trans-Afghan route, given its established connectivity with Iran and the Persian Gulf.
As for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, they have shown limited enthusiasm for the Trans-Afghan project. Their direct borders with China make them more likely to favor CPEC as a viable route to maritime ports. This divergence of interests within the region hinders the formulation of a coherent strategy and complicates the resolution of financing issues. The lack of regional consensus threatens to fragment efforts, reducing the momentum and viability of the Trans-Afghan initiative as a collective endeavor.
Uzbekistan’s Pragmatism
Uzbekistan is the most proactive country in advancing the idea of the Trans-Afghan Corridor. Tashkent has undertaken considerable efforts in this direction, having already completed the Termiz–Mazar-i-Sharif railway line. Uzbekistan approaches the project with pragmatic realism, fully aware of the many obstacles to its realization. The railway is seen not merely as a route to ocean access but also as a strategic component of Uzbekistan’s broader policy toward Afghanistan. Tashkent consistently promotes the notion that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. By linking Afghanistan to the region through rail and road infrastructure, Uzbekistan envisions the country as a potential close economic partner, which could contribute to regional security and foster pragmatic economic trust between neighbors.
Ultimately, however, Uzbekistan may, for the time being, prioritize access to seaports via Iran, recognizing it as the more immediate and feasible alternative. Nevertheless, the Trans-Afghan Corridor will remain on Tashkent’s strategic agenda, particularly as a tool to shape its policy approach toward Afghanistan. The project serves both as a symbol of long-term regional integration and as a practical instrument of Uzbekistan’s regional engagement.
Conclusion: Islamic Gateways
The relevance or irrelevance of the Trans-Afghan Corridor largely revolves around three Islamic countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Their bilateral relations and foreign policy decisions play a defining role in the fate of the continent’s major transport projects. These states serve as critical gateways to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, China, and the Indian Ocean. Beyond their geographic and strategic positions, they are also linked by Islamic statehood and, notably, by varying degrees of isolation or estrangement from the democratic world. Furthermore, the Balochistan issue touches all three, creating a shared challenge that could necessitate coordination or even joint security arrangements.
Given their geopolitical proximity, shared values, mutual challenges, and the international image each seeks to project, there is a significant possibility that these nations may pursue a collective understanding to establish order and advance international transport connectivity. Thus, the future of the Trans-Afghan Corridor will likely depend on the ability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran to forge a cooperative approach rooted in common strategic interests and regional necessity.
Islomkhon Gafarov,
Head of the Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, Institute for Advanced International Studies, PhD in Political Science
Hamza Boltaev,
Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Afghanistan and South Asian Studies, Institute for Advanced International Studies